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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine owning thousands of acres of pristine property inhabit-
ed by wildlife and valuable timber. It's the quintessential Ameri-
can dream; the property is yours, privately-owned, and the timber-
land is income producing. You labor many hours to attract wild-
life for hunting as well as nurture the timber for future harvest.
For decades you have managed this property and the hard work
has paid off. Migratory birds swarm your carefully-maintained
property, and in return have attracted skillful hunters. Over the
decades, the timber has healthily matured and is ready for har-
vest. Your land has flourished.
Unfortunately, beginning in 1993, the Army Corps of Engineers
("Army Corps") begins deviating from its flood control procedures,
at a local dam located upriver from your property, to extend the
harvest season for local farmers.' Since 1950, the Army Corps had
followed its Water Release Manual ("Manual") closely,2 and since
the Manual strategically manages water flow, your property has
flourished. However, the Army Corps' deviations from the Manual
have resulted in more water inundating your property for longer
periods of time each year.3 Although you object to the Army
Corps' deviations, they continue this plan.4 Only in 2001, when
you allege that these deviations have damaged your valuable tim-
ber, does the Army Corps .take your requests seriously and end the
1. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 603 (2009), rev'd, 637
F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev'd and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012), aff'd, 736 F.3d 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
2. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 603.
3. Id. at 606.
4. Id. at 603.
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deviations.' For eight years the Army Corps' deviations benefitted
local farmers at the expense of your trees. Due to congressionally
enacted statutes such as the Flood Control Act of 1928 and The
Federal Torts Claim Act, your only chance of recovery against the
government may be bringing a Fifth Amendment Takings Claim
under the Tucker Act, which grants the Court of Federal Claims
jurisdiction to hear constitutional cases, but not cases arising in
tort.6 Now, stop imagining because this scenario occurs often in
intentional government-induced temporal flood cases. The most
recent example, as described above, involves the hunting and tim-
berlands of the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission.
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States demon-
strates the quagmire that the tort versus taking distinction has
become in intentional government-induced temporal flood cases.
Simply stated, in an intentional government-induced temporal
flood case, the tort versus taking distinction is critical because a
landowner is precluded from recovering in tort against the gov-
ernment, but the landowner may recover under a Takings Claim
pursuant to the Tucker Act. Yet, court decisions "offer[] no guid-
ance in resolving the difference between takings and torts."'
Hence, attempts by courts to tackle the tort versus taking distinc-
tion have resulted in perplexing, inconsistent judicial opinions.
This note proposes that the tort versus taking distinction is im-
proper in the context of intentional government-induced temporal
floods. Instead, Takings Clause analysis, not tort analysis, is the
proper context when dealing with intentional government-induced
temporal floods. More specifically, this note suggests that all in-
tentional government-induced temporal floods are a taking and
that the proper inquiry for the courts in such cases is to determine
damages. Part II of this note discusses precedential Fifth Amend-
ment cases as well as important intentional government-induced
temporal flood cases in order to show the complexities of the tort
versus taking distinction in the context of intentional government-
induced temporal flood cases. Additionally, Part II of this note
presents the facts and rulings of the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States.
5. Id. at 606.
6. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
7. Nancie G. Marzulla, The Supreme Court Tackles Temporary Takings: Arkansas
Game & Fish Commission v. United States, 44 TRENDS 2 (Sept. 2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/trends/2012_13/september october/the supreme
courttackles temporary takings-arkansas-game-fish-commission v-united states.html.
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Part III of this note discusses the flaws with the tort versus taking
analysis currently used by the courts to decide intentional gov-
ernment-induced temporal flood cases. Because the application of
the tort versus taking analysis in intentional government-induced
temporal flood cases has become overly convoluted, this note sug-
gests that the focus in such cases ought to be on determining
damages rather than determining whether a cause of action exists
based on the arbitrary distinction of tort versus taking. Finally,
this note discusses the possibility of adopting the inverse ratio
rule, used in intellectual property law, when litigating damages in
intentional government-induced temporal flood cases.
II. ARKANSAS GAME & FISH COMMISSION V. UNITED STATES
A. Jurisprudential Framework
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states "Nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion."' Although the Takings Clause seems simple, its application
has required extensive judicial interpretation in intentional gov-
ernment-induced temporal flood cases because the court must de-
termine that a taking has occurred rather than a mere tort for a
cause of action to survive, an elusive distinction.? Courts struggle
to apply the Takings Clause to intentional government-induced
temporal flooding cases because the floods only "take" the land-
owner's property temporarily before receding.10 However, courts
have overlooked the obvious fact that these temporal floods still
take private property, even if the taking is not permanent." Most
recently, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to remedy the
law in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States. Ide-
ally, in Arkansas Game, the Supreme Court should have ruled
that all intentional government-induced temporal floods are tak-
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012) ("[N]o magic
formula enables a court to judge in every case whether a given government interference
with property is a taking.").
10. See Daniel L. Siegel & Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principles and
Unresolved Questions, 11 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 479, 482, 496 (2010) (establishing that prospec-
tively temporary floods are meant to be temporary from the outset; whereas retrospectively
temporary floods are intended to be permanent at the outset but turn out to be temporary).
11. See Richard A. Epstein, The Takings Clause and Partial Interests in Land: On
Sharp Boundaries and Continuous Distributions, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 592 (2013) (de-
scribing the court's flooding cases as an "incongruent distinction between permanent and
temporary takings").
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ings and that the proper inquiry for the court is to determine the
amount of damages. 12 Unfortunately, due to the Supreme Court's
narrower ruling, courts will continue to struggle in intentional
government-induced temporal flood cases with the "incongruent
distinction between permanent and temporary takings."" As a
result, when addressing intentional government-induced temporal
flood cases, courts will be forced to continue to rely on the four
precedential Supreme Court cases that set the general framework
for applying Takings Clause jurisprudence."
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court
addressed whether the New York state government's requirement
that a landlord permit the installation of cable television equip-
ment on the roof of her apartment building constituted a compen-
sable taking under the Takings Clause." The Court's holding in
Loretto established one of the black-letter rules of Takings Clause
jurisprudence: a permanent physical occupation of property, no
matter how minor, is a taking when authorized by the govern-
ment.16 Importantly, the permanent physical occupation need not
be exclusive so long as it impedes any one of the owner's property
rights." However, the Court carefully clarified that the Loretto
per se rule does not apply to government regulations unless the
landowner must forfeit property to a third party.'8
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the South Carolina state government's regula-
tion forbidding construction on Lucas' beachfront parcels consti-
12. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court made a much narrower ruling: "[Riecurrent
floodings, even if of finite duration, are not categorically exempt from Takings Clause lia-
bility." Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 133 S. Ct. at 515 (emphasis added).
13. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 592.
14. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 133 S. Ct. at 518. See generally Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306 (2002) (temporary regula-
tory takings); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (permanent regula-
tory takings eliminating all economically viable use); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (permanent physical takings); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978) (permanent regulatory takings eliminat-
ing some economically viable use).
15. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421-22 (establishing that the cables installed on the roof were a
minor encroachment, measuring only one-half inch in diameter and measuring thirty feet
in length).
16. Id. at 426.
17. See id. at 435 ("[Tihe government does not simply take a single 'strand' from the
'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.").
18. Id. at 440 (explaining that states may still "require landlords to comply with build-
ing codes and provide utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers,
and the like in the common area of a building [s]o long as these regulations do not require
the landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his building by a third party").
469
Duquesne Law Review
tuted a compensable taking." The Court's holding in Lucas estab-
lished another black-letter rule of Takings Clause jurisprudence:
government regulations that result in the loss of all economically
viable use of one's property require just compensation.2 0 There is
an exception to the Lucas rule: government regulations that pre-
vent public nuisances are outside Takings Clause jurisprudence.2 1
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the
Court addressed whether New York's Landmarks Preservation
Law which denied Penn Central the ability to build in the airspace
above its Grand Central Terminal amounted to a compensable
taking.2 2  The Court's decision in Penn Central recognized that
courts interpret Takings Clause jurisprudence by looking at the
parcel as a whole. 23 Therefore, the Court established a balancing
test, which in turn requires courts to consider the following factors
when dealing with government regulations that impair some, but
not all, of the economically viable use of property: (1) "the econom-
ic impact of the regulation" on the property owner, (2) "the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations" of the property owner, and (3) the "character
of the government action."24 Applying this balancing approach,
the Court concluded that Penn Central had not suffered a taking
because the Landmark Preservation Law "permit[s] reasonable
beneficial use of the [Grand Central Terminal]."25
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, the Court addressed whether a thirty-two
19. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
20. Id. at 1019 ("[WVhen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.").
21. Id. at 1022-23. See generally Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 369 U.S. 590,
590 (1962) (town ordinance forbidding pit excavation within its limits); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928) (state law permitting cutting down cedar trees to prevent spread
of blight to apple orchard); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404 (1915) (municipal
ordinance prohibiting brick manufacturing in residential community); Reinman v. City of
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 172 (1915) (city law prohibiting livery stables within city limits);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 623 (1887) (state law declaring all breweries as public
nuisances).
22. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
23. Id. at 130-31 ("Taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated ... [Tlhis Court focuses ... on the character . . . nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.").
24. Id. at 124 (explaining that physical invasions are more likely to result in takings
"than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life to promote the common good").
25. Id. at 138.
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month moratorium which forbade development while a land-use
plan for the region was formulated constituted a compensable tak-
ing.26 The Court reasoned that "the property will recover value as
soon as the prohibition is lifted."2 7 However, the Court seemed
genuinely concerned that long moratorium may result in a tak-
ing.28 Therefore, the Court decided that temporary regulatory tak-
ing claims, such as moratorium, should be evaluated using the
Penn Central test.29
B. Prior Flooding Cases
Flooding cases often present the courts with complex Takings
Clause problems that require courts to consider both general Tak-
ings Clause jurisprudence," as well as the Takings Clause juris-
prudence of historic flooding cases." Indeed, when the govern-
ment permanently invades one's land with flood-induced water,
the courts will always find a taking.3 2 On the other hand, for cases
involving intentional government-induced temporal flooding,
courts exert considerable effort attempting to balance the land-
owner's property rights with the government's interference with
those rights." In intentional government-induced temporal flood-
ing cases, courts struggle to define a taking because, on the one
hand, the government interferes with the landowner's right to ex-
clude others from his property, but, on the other hand, the land-
owner's dispossession is only temporary.34 Moreover, there is no
bright line between a permanent occupation versus a temporary
invasion." The effect of this lack of total dispossession of the
landowner's property rights coupled with a questionable boundary
between permanent occupation and temporary invasion becomes
26. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306
(2002).
27. Id. at 332.
28. Id. at 341 ("[Moratorium that last more than one year should be viewed with spe-
cial skepticism.").
29. Id. at 342. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
32. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982) (collect-
ing cases); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871) ("Where real
estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water . . . so as to effectually de-
stroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking.").
33. See infra notes 94-121 and accompanying text.
34. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12 ("[I]ntermittent flooding . . . [does] not absolutely
dispossess the owner of his right to use, and exclude others from, his property.").
35. See id. at 447-48.
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evident when reading the inconsistent, and sometimes untenable,
judicial decisions in intentional government-induced temporal
flooding cases.
In United States v. Cress, the government's construction of a
dam resulted in frequent overflows of water onto the landowner's
property." The Court determined that the frequent overflows at-
tributable to the dam constituted a permanent condition for which
the landowner was entitled to just compensation.3 7 Seven years
later, in Sanguinetti v. United States, the government's construc-
tion of a canal again resulted in recurrent flooding of a landown-
er's property." Although the land had experienced flooding prior
to the construction of the canal, the Court recognized that the
flooding after the canal's completion may have caused greater
damage to the land due to increased flooding.3 9 The Court stated
that for the government to be held liable for a taking a plaintiff
must show that the government's project directly resulted in a
permanent invasion of the plaintiffs land resulting in an appro-
priation.40 Because the landowner could still use his property, the
Court found no taking occurred in Sanguinetti.4 1
In United States v. Dickinson, a government dam resulted in the
permanent flooding of some of the landowner's property as well as
intermittent flooding of other portions of his property.42 Ultimate-
ly, the landowner reclaimed much of his land that had been taken
by flooding by using rock fill.4 3 Nonetheless, the Court held that
Dickinson's land had been taken and that subsequent actions by
Dickinson did not affect the takings analysis.4 4 In Barnes v. Unit-
36. 243 U.S. 316, 318 (1917).
37. Id. at 328 ("There is no difference of kind, but only of degree, between a permanent
condition of continual overflow by backwater and a permanent liability to intermittent but
inevitably recurring overflows; and, on principle, the right to compensation must arise in
the one case as in the other.").
38. 264 U.S. 146, 147 (1924).
39. Id. at 149, 150 (calling the increased damage conjectural as the appellant provided
little evidence other than claiming increased damage).
40. Id. at 149 ("[T]o create an enforceable liability against the government, it is at least
necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and constitute an actual,
permanent invasion of land amounting to an appropriation of and not merely an injury to
the property.").
41. Id. ("Appellant was not ousted, nor was his customary use of the land prevented.").
42. 331 U.S. 745, 746-47 (1947).
43. United States v. Dickinson, 152 F.2d 865, 871 (4th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 331 U.S. 745
(1947).
44. Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 751 ("[N]o use to which Dickinson could subsequently put
the property by his reclamation efforts changed the fact that the land was taken when it
was taken and an obligation to pay for it then arose.").
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ed States, government releases of water from a dam resulted in
the flooding of the landowner's property from 1969 to 1973.45
However, the court determined that the government only took the
landowner's property in 1973. Essentially, the Barnes decision
established that the government gets several "free" flood years
before a landowner can claim that intermittent flooding is foresee-
able.47
In summary, Loretto and Pumpelly illustrate that courts will
construe permanent flooding invasions of a landowner's property
as a taking." Moreover, Lucas suggests that any government
flooding regulation that extinguishes all economically viable uses
of property will be a taking." Furthermore, Cress supports the
proposition that intermittent inevitably recurring floods also con-
stitute a taking.50 Unfortunately, flooding cases that fall outside
the bright line rules associated with permanently flooded proper-
ty, inevitably recurring flooding, and flooding that destroys all
economically viable use of property are subject to uncertain judi-
cial discretion.
Sanguinetti, Dickinson, and Barnes show that if a flood is not
permanent, inevitably recurring, or does not destroy all economi-
cally viable uses of property then it is difficult to predict how
courts will rule.," Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierra demonstrate
that balancing tests inevitably favor the government; however,
this provides little certainty or guidance to landowners consider-
ing a takings claim and governments dealing with flooding deci-
sions.5 2 It is indisputable that more certainty is needed for inten-
tional government-induced temporal flooding cases, and the recent
Supreme Court decision of Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v.
United States evidences this need." As described immediately
below, Arkansas Game questions "whether a taking may occur,
within the meaning of the Takings Clause, when government-
induced flooding invasions, although repetitive, are temporary."5
45. 538 F.2d 865, 872-73 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
46. Id. at 873-74.
47. Id. at 873 ("[T]he date the [glovernment complete[s] taking its flowage easement
cannot be prior to when ... the permanent character of intermittent flooding could fairly be
perceived.").
48. See supra notes 15-17 and 32 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
53. 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
54. Id. at 515. See infra notes 56-93 and accompanying text.
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C. Facts of the Case
The Arkansas Game and Fish Commission" ("Commission")
owns and operates the Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Man-
agement Area ("Management Area").5 ' The Management Area
consists of 23,000 acres of land, adjacent to the Black River, which
the Commission maintains for hunting and wildlife. Within the
Management Area, hardwood bottomland timber provides a natu-
ral habitat for the wildlife and serves as a valuable source of in-
come to the Commission, and therefore, the Commission takes
great efforts to preserve the timber for regular harvests.
In 1948, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers" ("Army Corps")
completed construction of the Clearwater Dam ("Dam") 115 miles
55. The Arkansas Game and Fish Commission consists of seven Arkansans appointed
for seven-year terms by the governor, as well as the Chair of the University of Arkansas at
Fayetteville's Department of Biology, who serves as a non-voting member. About AGFC -
The Commission, ARK. GAME & FISH COMM'N,
http://www.agfe.com/aboutagfc/Pages/AboutCommission.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
"The Arkansas Game and Fish Commission's mission is to conserve and enhance Arkan-
sas's fish and wildlife and their habitats while promoting sustainable use, public under-
standing and support." About AGFC - Our Mission, ARK. GAME & FISH COMM'N,
http://www.agfc.com/aboutagfe/Pages/AboutMission.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
56. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 133 S. Ct. at 515.
57. Id. The Management Area provides top-quality waterfowl hunting as well as tur-
key, deer, quail, rabbit, squirrel, and crow hunting. Wildlife Management Area Details,
ARK. GAME & FISH COMM'N,
http://www.agfc.com/hunting/Pages/wmaDetails.aspx?show=170 (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
58. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 133 S. Ct. at 515-16. The dominant species of hard-
wood timber are nuttall oak, overcup oak, pin oak, and water oak. Wildlife Management
Area Details, ARK. GAME & FISH COMM'N,
http://www.agfc.com/hunting/Pages/wmaDetails.aspx?show=170 (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
The Commission strategically floods the hardwood timber to provide waterfowl habitat, and
the Commission also selectively thins trees to "stimulate the growth of new timber, to pro-
vide a diverse habitat type and to remove unhealthy or unproductive trees from the forest."
Id.
59. In 1824, after its decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, Congress used its Com-
merce power to give the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers authority to improve the navigation
of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, and Congress later amended the act to include other
U.S. rivers. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A Brief History - Improving Transporta-
tion, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG'RS,
http://www.usace.army.mil/AboutlHistory/BriefHistoryoftheCorps/lmprovingTransportatio
n.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). Furthermore, via the 1928 Flood Control Act and the
1936 Flood Control Act, Congress authorized the Army Corps to undertake flood control
measures by building reservoirs. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A Brief History -
Multipurpose Waterway Development, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENGINEERS,
http://www.usace.army.mil/About/History/BriefHistoryoftheCorpsfMultipurposeWaterwayD
evelopment.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). Finally, by passing The Flood Control Act of
1938, Congress authorized the Army Corps to undertake flood control projects in the area of
the country containing the Management Area, and the Army Corps began construction of
the Clearwater dam in 1940. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl.
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upstream from the Management Area." As a flood control project,
responsibility for maintenance and operation of the Dam belongs
to the Army Corps." In 1950, the Army Corps implemented a wa-
ter control plan, and in 1953, published The Clearwater Lake Wa-
ter Control Manual ("Manual").6 2 Initially, when implementing its
plan and determining water release rates, the Army Corps consid-
ered the agricultural growing season which roughly coincided with
the hardwood timber growing season, and the Army Corps at-
tempted to release water in a controlled manner in order to avoid
interfering with growing season." The Army Corps routinely fol-
lowed the Manual's water release rates until 1993 when it began
deviating from the Manual's water release rates at the request of
farmers.'
The Commission observed that after the Army Corps imple-
mented the deviations, the Management Area began experiencing
flooding above historical norms. Most concerning, these floods
occurred during the hardwood timber's growing season.66 The
Commission voiced concerns that the deviations from the water
release rates in the Manual, which the Army Corps had followed
for decades, may negatively impact the hardwood bottomland tim-
ber." The Commission pleaded for the Army Corps to cease the
594, 602 (2009), rev'd, 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev'd and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 511
(2012), affd, 736 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
60. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 133 S. Ct. at 516.
61. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 602.
62. Id. at 603 (the Manual states the Dam's primary purpose as "provid[ing] flood pro-
tection below the dam and to maintain a permanent conservation pool for recreation, fish
and wildlife, and other incidental uses").
63. Id. at 602 (the growing season for hardwood timber occurs roughly between April
and November).
64. Id. The planned deviations were implemented to provide farmers, located downriv-
er, with a longer harvest period. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 133 S. Ct. at 516. To achieve
these longer harvest periods, the Army Corps released water from the Dam at a slower rate
than called for by the Manual. Id. As a result, water levels in the Dam rose and the Army
Corps released the water for longer periods of time. Id.
65. Id.
66. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 603.
67. Id. at 603-04 (various other groups voiced concerns as well, including: the Commis-
sion, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the Missouri Conservation Department,
dock owners and campsite owners, and the drainage district). The Commission's main
concern was that "a much longer duration of stagnant water being held on the biologically
and economically valuable hard mast bearing species of trees," may have negative conse-
quences. Id. at 604.
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deviations and reestablish the water release rates called for by the
Manual; however, the deviations continued into the late 1990s."
In 1999, the Army Corps considered revising the Manual to
make the deviations permanent." Again, the Commission ex-
pressed its disapproval and concerns that the deviations negative-
ly impair its hardwood timber.7 Unfortunately for the Commis-
sion, the Army Corps contended that the effects from any devia-
tions from the Manual ceased in Missouri, long before reaching
the Management Area." In fact, after conducting an environmen-
tal research assessment, the Army Corps concluded that making
the water release deviations permanent would be of little or no
consequence. 2 Once more, the Commission disputed the Army
Corps' findings that the deviations resulted in little consequence.
By July 1999, the Commission noticed a dramatic increase in
hardwood timber mortality in the Management Area. The
Commission contended that the Army Corps deviations from the
Manual caused this increased timber mortality.75 The Army Corps
reiterated its view that deviations from the Manual did not cause
the increased timber mortality in the Management Area because
the effects from the deviations ceased at the Missouri/Arkansas
border." Despite its disbelief, the Army Corps conducted water-
stage testing and found that the deviations did, in fact, result in
water from the Dam reaching the Management Area.77  Further-
68. Id. The flooding that occurred in the Management Area when the Army Corps
followed the release rates dictated by the Manual resulted in "short-term waves of flooding
which... receded quickly." Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 133 S. Ct. at 516.
69. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 604.
70. Id.
71. Id. ("[The effect of Clearwater Dam diminishes at approximately the Mis-
souri/Arkansas state line ... due to the increased size of the watershed.").
72. Id. (a draft environment assessment prepared by the Army Corps described the
effects of making the deviations permanent as a "Finding of No Significant Impact").
73. Id. at 604-05 (the Commission had a "significant problem" with the new plan to
make the deviations permanent). Additionally, the U.S Fish and Wildlife Service claimed
that the Army Corps provided insufficient evidence to conclude that the effects of the
planned deviations end at the Missouri/Arkansas border. Id.
74. Id. at 601, 605 (Martin Blaney, the Statewide Habitat Coordinator for the Commis-
sion, testified that in 1999 "a massive die-off of oak timber" occurred that was "a stark
contrast from the healthy forest that [he had] seen before").
75. Id. at 600, 605 (Robert Zachary, Wildlife Supervisor for the Commission, contribut-
ed this damage to "stress caused by . . . stagnant water being in the [Management] [A]rea
during the growing season for consecutive years ... that led to a ... gradual decline, and
then finally a drastic change due to conditions in 1999").
76. Id. at 606 (Mike Hendricks, local Chief of Reservoir Control for the Army Corps
opined that the Commission's claim was "unfounded").
77. Id. (the Army Corps found that permanent deviations would "inundate[ ] the roots
of the hardwood trees in the wildlife management area").
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more, the Army Corps finally acknowledged that the deviations
may impact the hardwood timber in the Management Area. As a
result, in April 2001, the Army Corps ceased all deviations from
the Manual and abandoned plans to make the deviations perma-
nent.
In 2005, the Commission sued the Army Corps claiming that the
deviations from the Manual resulted in a compensable taking un-
der the Fifth Amendment.o The Commission relied on Dr. Mickey
Heitmeyer, a wetland ecologist, to establish that the deviations
resulted in water inundating the Management Area for greater
lengths of time compared to the time period prior to the devia-
tions." Dr. Heitmeyer's report established that the deviations
resulted in over fifty percent of the nuttall oaks being inundated
by water for, on average, forty-seven percent longer per year than
prior to the commencement of the deviations.8 2 Furthermore, Dr.
Heitmeyer noted that in 1997, part of the Management Area was
flooded for 166 days, ninety-five days longer than it had flooded on
average prior to the deviations." The Army Corps used a comput-
erized model to analyze the impact of the Dam on the Manage-
ment Area, both with and without the deviations. Even without
the deviations, the Army Corps' expert concluded that the Man-
agement Area would have experienced greater than average flood-
ing during the time period in question." In fact, the Army Corps
contended that, even without deviations, the Management Area
would have remained flooded for the majority of the hardwood
timber growing season during the years in question."
Moreover, both the Commission and the Army Corps relied on
timber consultants for expert reports. The Commission's timber
experts analyzed the hardwood timber from regions of the Man-
78. Id. (the district engineer for the Army Corps acknowledged that the deviations
"unacceptably extend[ed] the duration of water inundation on bottomland hardwoods").
79. Id. (the Army Corps acknowledged that it ceased the deviations due to concerns
about the effects the deviations had on bottomland timber in the Management Area).
80. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 516 (2012).
81. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 600, 608.
82. Id. at 608 (Heitmeyer used available water-gauge data collected by the Commission
to determine that prior to the deviations, from 1949 to 1992, fifty percent of the nuttall
oaks flooded on average 62.16 days/year; whereas, after the deviations commenced, from
1993-1999, fifty percent of the nuttall oaks flooded on average 91.14 days/year).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 608-09.
85. Id. at 609.
86. Id. ("[Tihe modeling predicted that there would have been flooding in the Manage-
ment Area for 72.8% of the days during the growing seasons from 1994 to 1999.").
87. Id. at 609-12.
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agement Area which had experienced increased flooding ("Low
Regions") as well as control regions located at higher elevations
that had not experienced flooding ("High Regions") resulting from
the Army Corp's deviations." Due to the healthy nature of the
hardwood timber in the High Regions," the Commission's timber
consultants believed that flooding caused the demise of the hard-
wood timber in the Low Regions.o Thus, the Commission's timber
experts concluded that the deviations caused the increased mor-
tality of the hardwood timber." The Army Corps' timber expert
analyzed the trees in both High and Low Regions and rejected the
Commission's timber expert's finding mainly because he could not
identify any sign of flood stress in the tree rings extracted from
the hardwood timber cores.92 The Court of Federal Claims faced a
difficult factual and legal analysis to determine whether the
Commission had established a compensable Fifth Amendment
Claim due to the temporal nature of the intentional government-
induced flooding.93
D. The Court of Federal Claims Decision
The Court of Federal Claims ("COFC") held that the Commis-
sion was entitled to just compensation from the government for
the taking of its interest in the bottomland hardwood timber."
The COFC found that the Army Corps' deviations resulted in reg-
ular flooding of the Management Area from 1993 to 1998." More-
over, the COFC determined that, with a reasonable investigation,
88. Id. at 609.
89. See id. at 610 ("[OIf the ten thousand red oaks analyzed in the two [High Regions],
no trees were dead and only 150 trees were in a declining state.").
90. Id. at 609-10 (the hardwood timber mortality rate in the Low Regions ranged be-
tween nine percent to fifty-nine percent per year and thirty to forty percent of these trees
exhibited a declining state of health).
91. Id. at 610 ("The prolonged growing season flooding (June-August) that occurred in
1994-1998 undoubtedly resulted in saturated soils, inadequate oxygen levels in the water
and the soil, increased root respiration, and significant root mortality and die-back in many
of the less water tolerant trees."). As further evidence of saturated soils, the timber experts
noted the invasion of wetland species, which thrive in saturated soil, into the Low Regions
of the Management Area. Id. at 613.
92. Id. at 611-12.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2503(c) (2012) (the Court of Federal Claims does not offer the right to a
jury: "The judges of the Court of Federal Claims shall fix times for trials, administer oaths
or affirmations, examine witnesses, receive evidence, and enter dispositive judgments").
94. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 640 (awarding damages of
$5,602,329.56). "The temporary taking of a flowage easement resulted in a permanent
taking of timber." Id. at 624-25.
95. Id. at 618-19.
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the Army Corps would have been capable of predicting the impact
of the deviations on the Management Area.9 6 Additionally, the
COFC rejected the Army Corps' claim that the summer droughts
of 1999 and 2000 were intervening causes in the destruction of the
Commission's timber.17  Furthermore, the COFC concluded that
the Commission's expert testimony sufficiently linked the devia-
tions to the flooding of the Management Area which, in turn,
caused the timber mortality." In summary, the COFC found that
the Commission met its burden of establishing that the Army
Corps' deviations from the Manual resulted in the destruction of
the Commission's timber, a compensable taking under the Fifth
Amendment."
E. The Federal Circuit's Reversal
The Federal Circuit held that no taking had occurred and re-
versed the COFC's decision.'00 In reaching its holding, the Federal
Circuit did not address whether the flooding of the Management
Area was predictable and sufficiently substantial to arise to a tak-
ing.'0o Consequently, the Federal Circuit decided that, as a matter
of law, temporary floods do not constitute a taking unless the
flooding is permanent or inevitably recurring.102 Because the Ar-
my Corps never implemented permanent deviations from the
Manual, and because the deviations only lasted between 1993 and
2000, the deviations were "inherently temporary."'03 Relying on
96. Id. at 623 ("Indeed, the Corps had available to it a computerized modeling system
that could have been used to evaluate potential hydrological effects of its deviations from
the water control plan. . . . In short, the effect of deviations in the Management Area was
predictable, using readily available resources and hydrological skills.").
97. Id. at 623-24 ("[Tihe fact that there was some later incident that may have 'tilted
the scale' . . . does not break the chain of foreseeable results of the government's authorized
action.").
98. Id. at 629-32 (expert reports demonstrating "the increased frequency and uniquely
sustained pattern of flooding in the Management Area during [the deviations]," as well as
the once "very healthy condition" of the timber were crucial to the COFC's finding).
99. Id. at 634 ("The government's temporary taking of a flowage easement over the
Management Area resulted in a permanent taking of timber from that property.").
100. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir.
2011), rev'd and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
101. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 637 F.3d at 1376 ("[W]e need not decide whether the
flooding on the Management Area was 'sufficiently substantial to justify a takings remedy'
or 'the predictable result of the government's action.'") (quoting Ridge Line, Inc. v. United
States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
102. Id. at 1378 ("[The Commission has] not met [its] burden to prove that the increased
flooding would be 'inevitably recurring' because the deviations were explicitly temporary.").
103. Id. at 1378-79.
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prior case law, The Federal Circuit concluded "flooding must be a
permanent or inevitably recurring condition, rather than an in-
herently temporary situation, to constitute the taking of a flowage
easement."10 4
Circuit Judge Pauline Newman, the lone dissenter, would have
affirmed the COFC's finding of a taking.o Judge Newman rea-
soned that permanent or inevitably recurring flooding is not re-
quired for one to claim just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.'o Moreover, Judge Newman recognized that "flood-
induced destruction of timber is permanent injury, and is compen-
sable within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.""0 ' Judge
Newman believed that the majority erred by focusing on whether
the Army Corps' deviation policy was permanent or temporary.0 s
Judge Newman contended that the proper takings analysis focus-
es on whether the flooding caused substantial damage before the
Army Corps ended the deviations."
F. The United States Supreme Court's Reversal
The United States Supreme Court unanimously1 o reversed the
Federal Circuit's holding that a flood must be permanent or inevi-
tably recurring to constitute a taking and remanded the case for
further proceedings."' Delivering the opinion of the Court, Jus-
tice Ginsburg framed the issue to be decided as "whether a taking
may occur, within the meaning of the Takings Clause, when gov-
104. Id. at 1378.
105. Id. at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1381 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Precedent does not require constant or per-
manent flooding, and eventual abatement of the flooding does not defeat entitlement to just
compensation. . . .").
107. Id. at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) (relying on Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d
762, 763-64 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
108. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting) ("My colleagues err . . . incorrectly holding that the
issue is solely whether the injurious flooding was eventually ended. My colleagues err in
ruling that: 'we do not focus on a structure and its consequence. Rather we must focus on
whether the government flood control policy was a permanent or temporary policy.'").
109. Id. at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The question is .. . whether the increased
flooding caused significant injury before the flooding was abated, such that, on balance, the
Fifth Amendment requires just compensation.").
110. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 515 (2012) (Justice
Kagan recused herself from the case).
111. Id. at 522 ("We rule today, simply and only, that government-induced flooding tem-
porary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings Clause inspection.") (em-
phasis added). The Supreme Court's ruling only eliminates the absolute bar to Takings
Clause analysis in temporal flood cases; it is important to note that the tort versus taking
analysis survives in temporal flood cases. See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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ernment-induced flood invasions, although repetitive, are tempo-
rary."112 The Court recognized that most takings cases require
fact-intensive inquiries."' Furthermore, the Court specified that
its precedent would not require that the Army Corps' deviations
be permanent in order to qualify as a taking. 114 The Court ex-
pressed its view that to evaluate a temporary physical invasion of
private property by the government, a court should consider fac-
tors including: (1) duration, (2) the intent or foreseeability of the
government action, (3) the "reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations" of the land's use, and (4) the severity of the interfer-
ence." After concluding that "recurrent floodings, even if of finite
duration, are not categorically exempt from Takings Clause liabil-
ity," the Court remanded the case so that the Federal Circuit
could consider whether the predictability and severity of the flood-
ing preclude takings liability.1 '
G. Decision on Remand
On remand, the Federal Circuit decided that (1) a physical tak-
ing occurred despite the fact that the government-induced floods
were only temporary,117 (2) sufficient evidence established that the
Army Corps' deviations from the Manual damaged trees," (3) suf-
ficient evidence established that it was foreseeable that deviation
from the Manual would damage trees,' 9 and (4) the intrusion was
severe enough to constitute a taking. 120 As such, the decision of
the COFC was affirmed.121
III. FLAWS IN THE CURRENT TORT VERSUS TAKING DISTINCTION
In Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States, the
Supreme Court reached the proper conclusion that temporary
112. Id. at 515.
113. Id. at 518 (there are some bright line rules, but "most takings claims turn on situa-
tion-specific factual inquiries").
114. Id. at 519 ("[W~e have rejected the argument that government action must be per-
manent to qualify as a taking.").
115. Id. at 522 (internal citations omitted).
116. Id. at 515, 523 ("Because the Federal Circuit rested its decision entirely on the
temporary duration of the flooding, it did not address [the causation, foreseeability, sub-
stantiality, and amount of damages].").
117. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
118. Id. at 1372.
119. Id. at 1374.
120. Id. at 1375.
121. Id. at 1367.
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flooding is not automatically barred from the Takings Clause pro-
tection guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 12 2 However, the Supreme Court ruled too narrowly
and missed an opportunity to remedy the law in the unique realm
of intentional government-induced temporal flood cases. 12 3 Law-
yers, landowners, government agencies, and planning commis-
sions will continue to struggle with temporary flooding deci-
sions. 124 This analysis section first addresses the flaws with the
tort versus taking analysis currently used by courts to decide in-
tentional government-induced temporal flood cases. Then, this
analysis section suggests that because the application of the tort
versus taking analysis has become elusive in intentional govern-
ment-induced temporal flood cases, courts deciding such cases
ought to focus on litigating damages rather than determining
whether a cause of action exists based on the arbitrary and elusive
distinction between torts and takings. Finally, this analysis sec-
tion discusses the possibility of adopting the inverse ratio rule,
used in intellectual property law, when litigating damages in in-
tentional government-induced temporal flooding cases.
A. The Arbitrary Tort Versus Taking Distinction Unfairly De-
termines Whether a Landowner Has a Cause ofAction When
His or Her Property is Taken by an Intentional Government-
Induced Temporal Floodl2 5
The practical importance of the tort versus taking distinction is
that it determines (1) whether the plaintiff has a cause of action
against the government for the intentional government-induced
122. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 515 (2012).
123. Temporary flooding cases are unique because a flood can affect property both when
the flood waters are present and long after such flood waters have receded. The flood not
only limits the landowner's use of his or her land for a set period of time (a temporal com-
ponent), but floods often have lasting effects that survive after the flood waters have reced-
ed (a lasting component). For instance, in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United
States, the Commission's use of the Management Area was limited by flood waters caused
by the Dam (the temporal component). See 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 603 (2009), rev'd, 637 F.3d 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2011), rev'd and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012), af'd, 736 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2013). But even after they receded, the flood waters' lasting effects in the Management
Area continued to impact the hardwood timberland mortality (the lasting component). See
id. at 610.
124. See generally Daniel L. Siegel, The Impact of Tahoe-Sierra on Temporary Regulato-
ry Takings Law, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 273, 274 (2005) ("Planners operate under
the fear that a court may find that their decision constitute[s] a taking.").
125. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) ("The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, when-
ever he receives injury."); see also Epstein, supra note 11, at 592.
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temporal flood, (2) which court has jurisdiction over the cause of
action, and (3) what is the relevant statute of limitations to initi-
ate the cause of action. First, the importance of the tort versus
taking distinction in deciding whether the plaintiff has a cause of
action against the government in intentional government-induced
temporal flooding cases can be traced back to the 1920s, when the
federal government authorized the Army Corps to undertake flood
control projects.'2 6 Congress passed the Flood Control Act of 1928,
which immunized the government from tort liability resulting
from government flood control projects.127 Therefore, a landowner
whose property attains damage from a government flood control
project may not sue the government in tort.128  As a result, the
landowner's only remedy is to sue the government under the Tak-
ings Clause.12 9
Next, the tort versus taking distinction determines in which
court the plaintiff may bring his or her cause of action against the
government. The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over
takings claims,13 0 but not tort claims"s' filed against the govern-
ment. Furthermore, the United States District Courts cannot
hear takings claims of more than $10,000.132 Finally, as for the
relevant statute of limitations, tort claims must be brought before
126. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
127. The Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (2006) ("No liability of any kind
shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood
waters at any place.").
128. See id.
129. Although 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) states that governments shall face "no liability," the
courts have interpreted the "no liability" language liberally; otherwise the statute may be
found unconstitutional for violating the Fifth Amendment. Turner v. United States, 17 Cl.
Ct. 832, 834-35 (1989), rev'd on other grounds by 901 F.2d 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
that 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) is subject to the limitations imposed by the Fifth Amendment); see
also Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 511 (2012) (No. 11-597) (Edwin Kneedler, attorney for the United States, stated "the
Flood Control Act of 1928 . . . says that the Government shall not be liable for any damage
to any property at any place resulting from floods or flood waters." Justice Scalia an-
swered, "lo]f course, that can't overrule the Takings Clause, can it? I mean, that's nice that
Congress doesn't want to be liable.").
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall
have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded.
upon the Constitution. . . .").
131. Id. § 1346(b)(1) (2012) (giving U.S. District Courts exclusive jurisdiction over loss of
property claims against the United States caused by the negligent act of any employee of
the government).
132. Id. § 1346(a)(2) (2012).
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the United States District Courts within two years,'33 whereas
takings claims can be filed with the United States Court of Feder-
al Claims for up to six years after the cause of action accrues. 134
Hence, the practical implications of the tort versus taking dis-
tinction are profound. If the court determines that the intentional
government-induced temporal flood damages occurred in tort,
then the landowner has no cause of action against the govern-
ment, and the questions of which court has jurisdiction and what
is the relevant statute of limitations become moot. 135 Thus, the
tort versus taking distinction is unfair and improper in intentional
government-induced temporal flooding cases because an arbitrary
line determines whether a cause of action exists. Courts ought to
focus on litigating damages rather than determining whether a
cause of action exists based on the arbitrary and elusive distinc-
tion between torts and takings.
B. Protecting the Government from Justly Compensating Land-
owners When its Actions Take the Landowner's Property Cre-
ates a Dangerous Moral Hazard
Congress passed the 1928 Flood Control Act to protect the gov-
ernment from liability arising from government flood control pro-
jects.' Among Congress' chief purposes in passing the 1928
Flood Control Act was to enable the Army Corps to manage flood
control projects without the fear of facing litigation. A recurring
anxiety of the government in temporal flooding cases is that
awarding damages for takings against the government risks dis-
ruption of flood control projects.137  The government fears that
"[e]very passing flood attributable to the government's operation
of a flood-control project, no matter how brief," may qualify as a
compensable taking.138 The Supreme Court observed in Arkansas
Game that the government's fear was unfounded. 3 9
133. Id. § 2401(b) (2012) ("A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred
unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after
such claim accrues . . .).
134. Id. § 2501 (2012) ("Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims
has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition is filed within six years after such claim
first accrues.").
135. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
137. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 521 (2012).
138. Id.
139. Id. ("To reject a categorical bar to temporary-flooding takings claims, however, is
scarcely to credit all or even many such claims.").
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Moreover, even if there is some merit to the government's fear
that allowing a cause of action against the government may im-
pede flood control projects, it does not follow that takings claims
should be barred against the government merely because the
claims arise in tort. 140 Barring takings actions merely because the
cause of action arises in tort greatly increases the government's
power and control over people's property, and history is ripe with
doctrines meant to limit the government's power.' 1 In fact, The
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is meant to protect a land-
owner from the government's overreaching power to take his or
her property.'4 2
In Romeo & Juliet, Shakespeare quipped "What's in a name?
That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as
sweet."143 Similarly, whether called a tort or a taking, intentional
government-induced temporal floods may cause damage to a land-
owner's property for which the landowner is entitled to a remedy.
The unfair consequence of the tort versus taking distinction is to
bar the landowner's remedy should the flood be called a tort.
Moreover, it has been suggested that "torts against property are
takings under the Fifth Amendment."'4 4 Hence, if a tort against
property is a taking, then there is no need to distinguish torts and
takings in the realm of intentional government-induced temporal
floods in the first place.
140. Id. (flooding cases should not be assessed "by resorting to blanket exclusionary
rules"); See Marzulla, supra note 7, at 5 ("Temporary takings are now part of established
jurisprudence. There is no logical reason to exclude flooding cases from general takings
law."); Daniel T. Smith, Note, Draining the Backwater: The Normalization of Temporary
Floodwater Takings Law in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States, 101
GEO L. J. ONLINE 57, 69 (2013), available at http://georgetownlawjournal.orglipsa-loquitur-
issue/101 (the Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n decision diminishes arguments both for and
against bright-line rules in Takings cases).
141. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments are insti-
tuted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . ."). See
generally MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY
405 (4th ed. 2011) ("The principle that law should protect the rights of individuals against
the abuses of governments can at least be dated back to John Locke's Two Treatises of
Government published in 1690. Locke believed that human rights, not governments, came
first in the natural order of things.").
142. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
143. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET 22 (London, Macmillan 1839).
144. See Arpan A. Sura, Comment, An End-run Around the Takings Clause? The Law of
Economics of Bivens Actions for Property Rights Violations, 50 WM & MARY L. REV. 1739,
1753 (2009) (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 35-38 (1985)).
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Indeed, to avoid a moral hazard, a government must be held re-
sponsible for the negative consequences of its actions. 1 5  In the
temporary takings realm, history demonstrates that the govern-
ment acts differently when it must face the detrimental conse-
quences of its actions. For example, after the Supreme Court
found a taking in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,146
South Carolina promptly settled the case, lifted the regulation
forbidding development, and sold the property to developers who
built homes on the very lots that Lucas had been forbidden from
developing. Similarly, in Arkansas Game, only the looming
threat of litigation resulted in the Army Corps ending the devia-
tions from the Manual that were causing the hardwood timber
damage in the Management Area."'s
The corollary to holding the government responsible for the
negative consequences of its actions is that the government will
fear that its actions may result in liability, hence hindering gov-
ernment efficiency.149 However, fear is necessary to motivate the
government to take precautions to try to avoid liability in the first
place. Without fear and the threat of takings liability, the gov-
ernment has little motivation to consider the landowner's best in-
terest. More importantly, landowners have little remedy when the
government temporarily takes, or even destroys, their property,
thus resulting in "an unstable system of recovery for individuals
whose property is destroyed by the government."5 o
A proponent for the tort versus taking distinction may argue
that while the government may not be legally obligated to com-
pensate landowners if the flooding is found to be a tort, the gov-
145. See Tyler J. Sniff, Comment, The Waters of Takings Law Should Be Muddy: Why
Prospectively Temporary Government-Induced Flooding Could Be a Per Se Taking and the
Role for Penn Central Balancing, 22 FED. CIR. B. J. 53, 76 (2012) ("[T]reatment under tak-
ings law and takings liability should also depend on the actual impact of a government
action on a plaintiffs property interest, rather than simply the government's intent.").
146. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
147. Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law Reform: A View
from the Trenches - A Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 837, 867 n.116 (1998) ("The state regulators' environmental zeal thus lasted only as
long as they thought they could stick Lucas with the cost of the proverbial free lunch. But
when faced with the tab themselves, preservation of Lucas' lots suddenly ceased being
environmentally important.").
148. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
149. See Siegel, supra note 124, at 274.
150. Stephen R. Catanzaro, Comment, The Home Taken Into the Takings Clause: An
Exploration of the Takings Clause and the Moral Obligation of the Government to Provide
Just Compensation. Student Scholarship Paper 195, 28 (2013),
http://erepository.law.shu.edulstudent-scholarship/195.
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ernment still has a moral obligation to compensate.15 1 Although
this doctrine of public necessity may be true, its application to the
government may be limited by government immunity, and land-
owners waiting on the government to act based upon a moral obli-
gation will often be disappointed. 15 2 In any event, regardless of
whether there is a moral obligation for the government to pay for
damages resulting from its attempts to improve flooding condi-
tions, the better method is to hold the government to its constitu-
tional duty to justly compensate for a taking. 153
C. The Current Tort Versus Taking Test is Unclear and Denies
Justice in Intentional Government-Induced Flooding Cases
1. The Tort Versus Taking Framework used in Intentional
Government-Induced Temporal Flooding Cases Fails the
Armstrong Principle
The quintessential problem with the current tort versus taking
framework used in intentional government-induced temporal
flooding cases is that it too often fails to protect individual land-
owners from the government's flooding choices.154 By amending
the United States Constitution to add the Fifth Amendment's Tak-
ings Clause, Congress intended to protect landowners from the
omnipotent government by providing landowners with just com-
pensation should the government take the landowner's private
property (the "Armstrong principle")."' However, the current
state of intentional government-induced temporal flooding juris-
prudence fails to protect landowners from the government.'
151. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965).
152. See id. at cmt. h (1965); cf Catanzaro, supra note 150, at 31 (explaining that Con-
gress acted to compensate oyster farmers despite a finding by the Federal Circuit that no
taking had occurred) (citing Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
153. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) ("We are in danger of forgetting
that a strong public desire to improve public condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.").
154. See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 148-50 (1924) (no taking); Big
Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 48, 59 (2012) (no taking); Barnes v. United
States, 538 F.2d 865, 873 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (no taking for several floods); Hartwig v. United
States, 485 F.2d. 615, 617 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (no taking); Fromme v. United States, 412 F.2d
1192, 1194-1195 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (no taking).
155. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensa-
tion was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
156. See Magdalene Carter, Note, Flooding the Possibility of Recovery Under a Tempo-
rary Takings Analysis: The Drowning Effects of Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v.
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Even after the Supreme Court's holding in Arkansas Game, courts
continue to give the federal government too much deference in
intentional government-induced temporal flooding cases, essen-
tially allowing the government to temporarily take private proper-
ty without providing the landowner with just compensation.
Most recently, the United States Court of Federal Claims
("COFC") gave the federal government great deference by dismiss-
ing an intentional government-induced temporal flood takings
claim in Big Oak Farms, Inc. v United States."' In Big Oak
Farms, many landowners alleged that the Army Corps violated
the Takings Clause by taking their property without providing
just compensation.'s The Army Corps exploded the levee that
protected the landowners' property, releasing flood waters that
damaged the landowners' property, crops, equipment, and infra-
structure.'"' In addition, the flood left sand and gravel deposits
strewn across the landowners' property.' The COFC relied on
the Federal Circuit's opinion in Arkansas Game and held that no
taking had occurred because "[rieleases that are ad hoc or tempo-
rary cannot, by their very nature, be inevitably recurring."''
Following the Supreme Court's reversall62 of the Federal Circuit
in Arkansas Game, the COFC instructed both parties to address
the effects of the reversal on the COFC's earlier decision163 deny-
ing a takings claim.164 The COFC declined to reconsider its earlier
decision.16' The COFC reasoned that reconsideration was unnec-
essary because "Arkansas Game addressed simply and only
whether 'repeated' government-induced flooding, if temporary in
nature, was exempt from the Takings Clause. The Supreme Court
United States, 23 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 211, 245 (2012) (recognizing that in temporal flooding
cases, courts give "the government unprecedented power to occupy private property without
just compensation," and further recognizing that the courts permit the federal government
to "disregard ... the environmental destruction caused by such a taking").
157. 105 Fed. Cl. at 59.
158. Id. at 50.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 55-56 (quoting Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev'd and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012)).
162. The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit's decision on December 4, 2012.
Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 523 (2012).
163. The COFC ruled on May 4, 2012 that no taking had occurred in Big Oak Farms, 7
months prior to the Supreme Court's December 4, 2012 holding in Arkansas Game. Big
Oak Farms, Inc., 105 Fed. Cl. at 48.
164. Order Following Arkansas Game at 2, Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, No. 11-
275L (Fed. Cl. 2012), ECF No. 54.
165. See id. at 3.
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did not address whether a single flood can give rise to a claim for a
taking as opposed to a tort.""' Essentially, the COFC continues to
hold that a single flood can never rise to the level of a taking, and,
therefore, in all cases, the government is entitled to freely flood
one's property at least one time."' Thus, the most recent inten-
tional government-induced temporal flooding case indicates that
the COFC continues to struggle interpreting the tort versus tak-
ing distinction and improperly takes the easy road by categorically
exempting a landowner's one-time flood claim from ever succeed-
ing with a Takings Clause cause of action.' Because the govern-
ment exploded the levee in Big Oak Farms to protect some land-
owners in Cairo, Illinois,6"' it clearly follows that the court failed
to satisfy the Armstrong principle when it forced other landowners
to suffer the brunt of the resultant intentional government-
induced temporal flooding damage while also withholding just
compensation.170 Therefore, in intentional government-induced
temporal flood cases, courts ought to focus on litigating damages
rather than determining whether a cause of action exists based on
the arbitrary and elusive distinction between torts and takings.
By following such a procedure, the Armstrong principle is more
easily satisfied.
2. It is Unclear How Many Intentional Government-Induced
Temporal Floods Turn a Mere Tort into a Taking
The frequency of flooding required to rise to the level of a taking
has created a judicial quagmire resulting in decisions inconsistent
with general takings jurisprudence. For example, the courts con-
sistently hold that one flood does not rise to the level of a taking.'71
However, holding that one flood does not rise to the level of a tak-
ing is inconsistent with earlier general takings cases where the
166. See id.
167. In reality, the government flooded the landowner's property twice; however, the
COFC says that the two floods are too remote to be considered recurring floods. Big Oak
Farms, Inc., 105 Fed. Cl. at 56.
168. Smith, supra note 140, at 68-69 ("In spite of the Supreme Court's doctrinal move
away from per se rules that invalidate takings claims, the Big Oak Farms court's decision
not to reconsider the case suggests lower courts may continue to treat factors such as sub-
stantiality and frequency as dispositive, limiting the practical effects of the Arkansas deci-
sion.").
169. 105 Fed. Cl. at 50.
170. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Big Oak Farms, 105 Fed. Cl. at 56; Hartwig v. United States, 485 F.2d
615, 620 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Fromme v. United States, 412 F.2d 1192, 1196 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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courts decided that the government must pay just compensation
for a single physical temporary taking. 17 2 Furthermore, an abso-
lute bar on one flood constituting a taking is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's recent decisions which aim to avoid per se rules
invalidating takings claims.'
Besides, if one flood cannot constitute a taking then how many
floods must a landowner suffer before his claim rises to the level of
a taking rather than a mere consequential tort? Unfortunately,
the court has not clearly answered this question. 7 4 Rather, one is
left to decipher unclear rules. For example, "[g]overnment-
induced flooding not proved to be inevitably recurring occupies the
category of mere consequential injury, or tort.""' Although at first
glance this rule seems adequate, no clear guidelines mark the
boundary between inevitably recurring floods which face liability
for government takings and occasional floods which evade any
government liability, making the rule difficult to apply."'
Additionally, the durational uncertainty required to find a tak-
ing, as opposed to a mere tort, is exacerbated by the Federal Cir-
cuit's inconsistent decisions in cases with nearly identical facts.
For example, in Arkansas Game,"' the Federal Circuit's majority
opinion failed to discuss Cooper v. United States,"' a case directly
on point; however, in her dissenting opinion, Justice Newman ad-
dressed the case."' In Cooper, the Army Corps project blocked a
river which caused Cooper's farm to flood for five consecutive
years.so Consequently, the standing water stressed Cooper's tim-
ber during the growing season and Cooper's trees began to die.'
The Federal Circuit found that a taking of Cooper's timber had
172. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 16 (1949); United
States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374-75 (1946); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
173. Smith, supra note 140, at 68.
174. Three floods may not be a taking. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
Two floods may not constitute a taking. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
175. Barnes v. United States, 538 F.2d 865, 870 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
176. Natl By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1273 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ("The
distinction between 'permanent liability to intermittent but inevitably recurring overflows',
and occasional floods induced by governmental projects, which we have held not to be tak-
ings, is, of course, not a clear and definite guideline.").
177. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev'd
and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
178. 827 F.2d 762 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
179. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 637 F.3d at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting).
180. Cooper, 827 F.2d at 762.
181. Id.
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occurred.1 82 Considering the court's holding in Cooper, it is un-
clear how the Federal Circuit could conclude, in Arkansas Game,
that flooding from 1993 through 2001 that destroyed the Commis-
sion's timber did not also amount to a taking.1 3 Therefore, in in-
tentional government-induced temporal flood cases, courts ought
to focus on litigating damages rather than trying to decipher the
arbitrary line transforming the flood from a mere tort to a taking.
3. It is Unclear What Level of Intent/Foreseeability Turns a
Mere Tort into a Taking
Clearly, for a court to award damages in a tort or takings action
against the government, the plaintiff must show the government
caused the damages. Although this principle seems simple, the
tort versus taking distinction makes it quite confusing for the
courts.
In Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, the court described the two-
part test to distinguish physical takings from torts."' First, a tak-
ing requires that the government "intends to invade a protected
property interest or the asserted invasion is the 'direct, natural, or
probable result of an authorized activity . . . Second, the
court must consider whether the government's interference with
property rights was "substantial and frequent enough to rise to
the level of a taking."8 e Essentially, the first prong requires the
court to determine if the harm "[was] the predictable result of the
government's action, and whether the government's actions were
sufficiently substantial to justify a takings remedy.""'
The courts have experienced great difficulty determining
whether harm is predictable and what is the relevant standard of
predictability. In Moden v. United States, addressing the causa-
tion prong of the Ridge Line test, the Federal Circuit stated that a
"plaintiff must prove that the government should have predicted
or foreseen the resulting injury."' Four days earlier, in Hansen
182. Id. at 763-64.
183. Ark. Game & Fish Corm'n, 637 F.3d at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The floods
in Cooper and the government activity that caused them were no less 'inherently tempo-
rary,' the words by which the majority characterizes the flooding, than the recurring re-
leases here.").
184. 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
185. Id. (internal citation omitted).
186. Id. at 1357.
187. Id. at 1355.
188. 404 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
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v. United States, addressing the causation prong of the Ridge Line
test, the COFC stated that the proper inquiry was if "the harm
could have been foreseen... ."a
Although the difference between "could have been foreseen" and
"should have been foreseen" seems minor, this determination can
be dispositive of the tort versus taking distinction. For example,
in Moden, the plaintiffs needed to prove that it should have been
foreseen that chemical solvents, used by the Air Force base, would
be released into the groundwater. 90 Although an Air Force engi-
neer testified "underground leaks in drainage systems are possi-
ble," the court found that, at most, this merely indicated the
cause-in-fact of the claimed injury. 91 Despite the fact that the
engineer's testimony showed that the Air Force "could have fore-
seen" the chemical solvent entering the groundwater, the Federal
Circuit determined that this did not mean that the injury should
have been foreseen.192 Therefore, the Modens failed to satisfy the
first prong of the Ridge Line test required to find a taking. Moden
demonstrates the importance of having a causation standard that
is understood and applied uniformly by the courts, especially
when that determination is dispositive of the tort versus taking
distinction. By focusing on damages, rather than the tort versus
taking distinction, the court could eliminate the possibility of bar-
ring recovery based on an unclear factor.
D. A Better Method for Resolving Temporal Flooding Cases
As demonstrated above, what constitutes a taking, as opposed to
a tort, is not a question to which there is likely to be agreement
across temporal flooding cases.193 Under the current law, inten-
tional government-induced temporal flooding cases turn on
whether the plaintiffs claim rises to a taking because 33 U.S.C. §
702(c) precludes liability against the government in tort.194 There-
fore, in an intentional government-induced temporal flooding case,
the plaintiffs taking claim must satisfy a set of unclear balancing
factors before the plaintiff can establish any liability. Basing tak-
ings liability on the tort versus taking distinction is fundamental-
189. 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 97 (2005) (emphasis added).
190. 404 F.3d at 1344.
191. Id. at 1345.
192. See id.
193. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 604.
194. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
Vol. 52492
Summer 2014 Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n
ly flawed because "torts against property are takings under the
Fifth Amendment.""' Hence, a more practical approach in tem-
poral flooding cases would focus on litigating damages rather than
litigating whether an intentional government-induced temporal
flood crosses the arbitrary, imaginary line that delineates a tort
from a taking.'
Of course, by focusing on damages in an intentional govern-
ment-induced temporal flooding case, the question shifts to causa-
tion. If the landowner can prove that the government flood control
project caused the damages to the landowner's property, a tort has
occurred; because a tort against property is a taking,"' by logical
deduction a taking has occurred. Once a taking is found there are
many possible options for calculating damages."'
Applying a takings analysis in intentional government-induced
temporal flood cases resolves many issues currently plaguing the
intentional government-induced temporal flooding jurisprudence.
First, if the landowner can establish that a tort to his property
resulted from the intentional government-induced temporal flood,
then the landowner will experience the fairness and justice called
for by the Armstrong principle because his cause of action no long-
er depends on the arbitrary line delineating torts from takings. 99
When applying a tort versus taking distinction in an intentional
government-induced temporal flood case, a landowner whose claim
sounded in tort forfeited his chance at collecting damages because
he failed to have a cause of action against the government.200
However, by applying a takings analysis in intentional govern-
ment-induced flood cases, if the landowner can establish that the
government flooded his property, he gets his day in court to liti-
gate damages. As such, by simply applying a takings analysis the
landowner may litigate damages and will not be forced to "bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole."201
Furthermore, applying a takings analysis in intentional gov-
ernment-induced temporal flood cases is a logical extension of the
195. See Sura, supra note 144, at 1753.
196. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 600 (calling for "liability by rule, damages by de-
gree").
197. See Sura, supra note 144, at 1753.
198. See Siegel & Meltz, supra note 10, at 513-23.
199. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
200. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
201. See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
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Supreme Court's "doctrinal move away from per se rules that in-
validate takings claims .... "202 Under current law, because the
case of an individual flood sounds in tort, it can never amount to a
taking.203 Although recurrent flooding was at issue in Arkansas
Game rather than a single flood, the Supreme Court's holding that
"recurrent floodings, even if of finite duration, are not categorical-
ly exempt from Takings Clause liability,"204 illustrates a desire to
avoid rules that categorically bar takings actions. Moreover, the
Court addressed that "most takings claims turn on situation-
specific factual inquiries. By utilizing a takings analysis in a
single flood case, courts could simply apply the situation specific
factual inquiry to litigating damages rather than barring the ac-
tion entirely. Holding that a single flood can never amount to a
taking clearly fails the Armstrong principle as well. Thus, the
move to avoid categorical exemptions from Takings Clause liabil-
ity supports the idea of applying a takings analysis in intentional
government-induced temporal flooding cases.
Moreover, applying a takings analysis in intentional govern-
ment-induced temporal flood cases avoids the difficulties associat-
ed with the Ridge Line test.2 06 Instead of trying to apply the ab-
stract Ridge Line test to determine if a cause of action exists, the
court is left to litigate what level of damages the flooding war-
rants. As such, the landowner's burden shifts to proving what
level of just compensation the government owes for its temporary
use of the landowner's private property. Although a landowner's
and court's opinion of what constitutes just compensation may
differ, receiving less just compensation is more just and fair than
barring a cause of action based on the arbitrary tort versus taking
distinction.
Also, applying a takings analysis in intentional government-
induced temporal flood cases will not result in the government
owing substantial just compensation in all cases. In some cases
the government may owe nominal or small amounts of just com-
pensation. Because in temporal flooding cases, "torts against
202. Smith, supra note 140, at 68.
203. See, e.g., Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, 105 Fed. C1. 48, 56 (2012); Hartwig
v. United States, 485 F.2d 615, 620 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Fromme v. United States, 412 F.2d 1192,
1196 (Ct. C1. 1969).
204. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 515 (2012).
205. Id. at 518 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
206. See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
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property are takings under the Fifth Amendment,"207 the govern-
ment may limit the just compensation due by proving that the in-
tentional government-induced temporal flood did not proximately
cause the landowner's damage or that a concurrent cause existed.
For example, if the Army Corps could prove that a landowner's
trees suffered from blight before the temporal flooding began, then
the Army Corps could limit the just compensation due. More im-
portantly, the Army Corps may only owe nominal damages if the
landowner's property produced no income and the flooding caused
no property damage. For example, if the Army Corps merely
flooded an empty field or a forest, where the landowner does not
harvest timber, then the landowner would fail to prove anything
more than nominal damages. Hence, applying a takings analysis
in intentional government-induced temporal flood cases will not
result in the government owing substantial just compensation in
all cases. Furthermore, judicial activism is a possibility, and it is
plausible that judges may find ways to mitigate or award nominal
damages in close cases. The government may still receive some
deference in intentional government-induced temporal flood cases,
and if such is the case, only landowners with very strong claims
will succeed.
E. An Inverse Ratio Rule
A difficult conundrum in intentional government-induced tem-
poral flooding cases is that the government could be held liable for
remote flood damages. To limit damages in scenarios involving
very remote flooding, courts could adopt the inverse ratio rule
from intellectual property law.208 In the context of damages in a
government-induced temporal flooding case, the inverse ratio rule
would require a lesser showing of intent or knowledge that the
plaintiffs land would flood if there is a strong showing that a good
faith effort at computer modeling would have predicted the flood-
ing of the plaintiffs land.209 Stated differently, landowners adja-
cent to or in close proximity to the dam should almost always be
207. Sura, supra note 144, at 1753.
208. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (es-
tablishing that in copyright infringement cases where there is weak proof of access to the
copyrighted material and only circumstantial evidence establishes substantial similarity
the court applies an inverse ratio test, which requires a lesser showing of substantial simi-
larity if there is a strong showing of access).
209. Computer modeling is already used in the context of intentional government-
induced temporal floods. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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justly compensated with their full amount of proven damages. If a
more remote landowner, whose property is located further from
the dam, can show that good faith computer modeling would have
predicted that his or her property would flood, then this landown-
er should also be justly compensated his or her full amount of
proven damages.21 If a remote landowner, whose property is lo-
cated further from the dam, cannot show that good faith computer
modeling would have predicted the flooding of his or her property,
then the court is left to determine what compensation is owed to
the landowner. Using an inverse ratio test would result in the
government owing just compensation for government-induced
temporal floods, but in remote flood cases the court may exercise
more judicial discretion in determining the amount of just com-
pensation due to the landowner.
IV. CONCLUSION
Intentional government-induced temporal floods are a taking
and the proper inquiry for the court is to determine the amount of
damages. When a lay person is asked whether the government
ought to be held liable for intentional government-induced tem-
poral flooding of one's property, the common sense answer dictates
that the government ought to be held liable. Yet, the unclear na-
ture of the Takings Clause's application to intentional govern-
ment-induced temporal flooding cases often results in no liability
due to statutes such as the Flood Control Act of 1928 as well as
arbitrary court decisions premised on the tort versus taking dis-
tinction. The Arkansas Game and Fish Commission spent nine
years as a party in the court system to be justly compensated for
government-induced floods that destroyed its timber. The Arkan-
sas Game and Fish Commission's ordeal illustrates the need for a
simpler application of takings claims in the intentional govern-
ment-induced temporal flooding context. Accordingly, because
torts against property are takings, intentional government-
induced temporal flooding cases should focus on damages to de-
termine liability instead of attempting to apply an unclear and
arbitrary tort versus taking analysis.
210. Even located 115 miles from the dam, a good faith effort at computer modeling
would have predicted the flooding of the Management Area. See supra notes 60 and 96
and accompanying text.
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